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Abstract	  
The	  Government	  of	  Indonesia	  (GOI)	  has	  been	  proposing	  a	  draft	  act	  on	  financial	  service	  regulatory	  
authority,	   called	  Otoritas	   Jasa	  Keuangan	   (OJK	  hereafter).	   In	   the	  aftermath	  of	  1998	  Asian	  crisis,	  
the	   establishment	   of	   the	   institution	   was	   mandated	   through	   Bank	   Indonesia	   Act	   (Indonesia’s	  
central	  bank	  bill)	   in	  1999,	  which	  was	  later	  updated	  in	  2004.	  According	  to	  the	  draft	  act,	  the	  OJK	  
has	  been	  designed	  using	  an	   integrated	  approach,	  which	   is	  similar	  to	  the	  arrangement	  of	  FSA	  in	  
the	   UK.	   This	   paper	   aims	   to	   examine	   the	   feasibility	   of	   establishing	   OJK.	   The	   existing	   financial	  
supervision	  suffers	  from	  several	  problems:	  a)	  the	  quality	  of	  supervisions	  tend	  to	  be	  heterogeneous	  
among	  the	  financial	  supervision	  bodies,	  b)	  there	  is	  a	  gap	  in	  supervision,	  whereby	  thousand	  of	  non-­‐
banking	   financial	   institutions	  have	  not	  been	   supervised	  properly,	  and	  c)	   financial	  offences	  have	  
been	  flourishing	  in	  inter	  market	  transactions.	  We	  found	  that	  the	  establishment	  of	  OJK,	  however,	  
would	   not	   minimize,	   let	   alone,	   resolve	   the	   problems	   above.	   The	   draft	   act	   has	   not	   proposed	   a	  
mechanism	  on	  how	  to	  address	  these	  very	  issues.	  We	  estimated	  the	  minimum	  irreducible	  costs	  of	  
establishing	  and	  operating	  OJK	  and	   found	  that	   the	  costs	  are	  paramount.	  According	  to	   the	  draft	  
act,	   the	   costs	   would	   burden	   all	   financial	   institutions	   and	   obviously	   this	   creates	   complexity	   in	  
financing	  OJK.	   Finally,	   two	  alternative	  approaches	  have	  been	  proposed	   in	  order	   to	   improve	   the	  
feasibility	   and	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   the	   OJK	   by	   considering	   the	   structure	   of	   financial	   sector	  
supervision	  in	  Indonesia.	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1. Introduction	  The	   ever	   tremendous	   development	   of	   financial	   sector	   is	   calling	   for	   the	   importance	   of	   sound	  supervision	   and	   regulation	   of	   financial	   sector.4	   Financial	   sector	   is	   the	   focal	   point	   of	   an	  economic	  system,	  failure	  in	  the	  sector	  will	  most	  likely	  destabilize	  the	  economy	  (Stiglitz,	  1994).	  The	  Asian	  1998	  financial	  crisis,	  for	  example,	  was	  the	  costliest	  ever	  recorded	  for	  Indonesia.	  The	  bailout	   of	   banking	   sector	   accounted	   for	   about	   50%	   of	   Indonesia’s	   GDP	   at	   that	   time	   and	   the	  economy	  shrank	  by	  about	  13%	  as	  the	  aftermath.	  This	  phenomenon	  is	  in	  line	  with	  World	  Bank’s	  (2009)	   argument	   that	   breakdown	   of	   financial	   sector	   leads	   to	   economic	   slowdown.	   Many	  countries	   reassign	   the	   role	   of	   financial	   sector	   supervision	   from	   their	   central	   bank	   to	  independent	  supervision	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  1998	  Asian	  economic	  crisis.	  Historically,	   monetary	   authority	   established	   a	   financial	   supervision	   authority	   as	   a	  precautionary	   action	   to	   minimize	   the	   potential	   of	   economic	   crisis.	   The	   structure	   of	   the	  authority	  is	  established	  in	  such	  a	  way	  in	  order	  to	  stabilize	  financial	  system	  in	  normal	  state	  and	  to	  withstand	  the	  shocks	  in	  period	  of	  crisis.	  However,	  many	  believe	  that	  blips	  in	  the	  regulation	  of	   financial	   sector	   triggered	   the	   crisis	   in	   2008.	   One	   of	   the	   major	   blips	   was	   the	   lack	   of	  supervision,	   which	   include	   macroprudential	   supervision,	   by	   the	   authority	   (Group	   of	   Thirty,	  2009;	  Brunnermeier	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  de	  Larosiere	  Group,	  2009;	  Kawai	  dan	  Pomerleano,	  2010).	  	  There	   are	   five	   financial	   supervision	   approaches	   that	   are	   practiced	   around	   the	   world:	  institutional5,	   functional6,	   integrated7,	   twin	   peaks8,	   and	   dual	   system9.	   Each	   approach	   offers	  different	  advantages	  and	  disadvantages	  and	  there	   is	  no	  rule	  of	   thumb	  to	  decide	  which	  one	   is	  better.	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  even	  if	  two	  countries	  adopt	  a	  similar	  approach,	  the	  optimal	  function	  and	  structure	  of	  the	  authority	  may	  vary	  (The	  Group	  of	  Thirty,	  2008).	  Several	  studies	  
                                                      
4 Regulation role refers to policy making activities while supervision role refers to activities to ensure the industry’s conformity with 
the regulation. 
5 Firm’s legal status determines which regulator is assigned to supervise their activities (China, Hongkong, and Mexico). 
6 Firm’s type of transaction determine the authority without regard to their legal status (Brazil, Italy, and Spain) 
7 Single authority to practice the safety and soundness supervision and conduct-of-business regulation (Canada, Germany, Japan, 
Qatar, and United Kingdom) 
8 Safety and soundness supervision and conduct of business regulation is assigned to two different authorities (Australia and 
Netherland) 
9 Supervision authority with functional and institutional approach (United States). 
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suggest	  that	  there	  is	  no	  best	  practice	  that	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  all	  economy	  in	  general.10	  Barth	  et	  al.	  (2004)	   found	   that	   multiple	   regulatory	   approaches	   may	   not	   necessarily	   enhance	   the	  performance	  of	  the	  sector.	  These	  findings	  indicate	  that	  the	  structure	  of	  a	  financial	  supervision	  authority	   must	   be	   established	   uniquely	   to	   conform	   to	   the	   economic	   system	   in	   a	   particular	  country.	  Indonesia	  is	  on	  the	  verge	  of	  establishing	  Otoritas	  Jasa	  Keuangan	  (OJK	  hereafter),	  the	  financial	  sector	  regulatory	  authority,	  which	  intend	  to	  adopt	  the	  integrated	  approach.	  The	  institution	  was	  proposed	  over	  a	  decade	  ago	  through	  article	  34	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  Indonesia	  Act	  in	  1999	  and	  it	  was	  later	  ammended	  in	  2004	  regarding	  the	  role	  and	  function	  of	  Bank	  Indonesia	  (Indonesia’s	  central	  bank).	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  article	  was	  greatly	  influenced	  by	  the	  outcome	  of	   1998	  Asian	   crisis	   and	   the	   ongoing	   trend	   around	   the	  world	   to	   introduce	   such	   authority	   in	  various	  countries.11	  The	  Act	  mandates	  that	  banking	  supervision	  should	  be	  conducted	  by	  an	  independent	  institution,	  called	   Lembaga	   Pengawas	   Sistem	  Keuangan	   (LPSK)	   The	   article,	   however,	   does	   not	   specify	   a	  particular	   approach	   that	   should	   be	   exercised	   by	   the	   institution.	   The	   government,	   however,	  suggested	   that	   the	   institution	   should	   adopt	   the	   integrated	   approach,	   similar	   to	   FSA	   in	   the	  United	  Kingdom,	  and	  called	  the	  institution	  as	  Otoritas	  Jasa	  Keuangan	  (OJK).	  The	  Act	  mandated	  that	   OJK	   supervises	   all	   financial	   sectors	   in	   Indonesia	   including	   banking,	   insurance,	   stock	  market,	   pension	   fund,	   venture	   capital,	   financing	   companies,	   mutual	   funds,	   and	   other	  institutions	  that	  collect	  funds	  from	  the	  economy.	  This	   paper	   aims	   to	   examine	   the	   feasibility	   of	   	   OJK	   by	   considering	   the	   structure	   of	   financial	  sector	  in	  Indonesia.	  Section	  2	  describes	  	  the	  structure	  of	  financial	  sector	  in	  Indonesia.	  Section	  3	  discusses	  the	  complexities	  and	  advantages	  of	  OJK’s	  structure	  as	  proposed	  by	  the	  government.	  In	  order	   to	  analyse	   the	   feasibility	  of	   the	  OJK,	  cost	  of	  establishment	  and	  operation	  of	  OJK	  was	  conducted.	  Section	  4	  presents	   the	  estimation	  of	   the	  establishment	  and	   the	  operation	  costs	  of	  the	   OJK.	   Section	   5	   discusses	   two	   alternative	   models	   of	   supervision	   in	   financial	   sector	   by	  
                                                      
10 Nier (2009), Cervellati dan Fioriti (2007), Barth et al. (2002, 2004) dan Crockett (2001) 
11 Under Indonesian constitution, every single article should be based on and backed up by findings from academic paper. 
Unfortunately, there is no record on that the existence of the article was justified by academic papers.  
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revitalizing	   the	   existing	   supervision	   bodies.	   The	   models	   have	   been	   designed	   by	   taken	   into	  consideration	  the	  structure	  of	  financial	  sector	  in	  Indonesia.	  
2. Structure	  of	  Financial	  Sector	  in	  Indonesia	  Financial	   sector	   in	   Indonesia	   is	   comprised	   of	   two	  main	   industries:	   banking	   and	  nonbanking.	  The	  banking	   industry	   in	  Indonesia	  consists	  of	  conventional	  banks,	  Syaria	  banks,	  and	  people’s	  credit	   banks	   (BPR	   hereafter).	   Nonbanking	   industry	   consists	   of	   insurance,	   stock	   market,	  pension	   fund,	   cooperatives,	   pawn	   system	   (Pawn	   office	   hereafter)	   and	   financing	   companies.	  Table	  1	  shows	  the	  number	  of	  financial	  institutions	  in	  Indonesia	  excluding	  cooperatives.12	  
Table 1. Number of Financial Institutions in Indonesia excluding Cooperatives 
Financial Institutions Number of Institutions/Issuers 
Banking sector  
    Conventional bank1 121 
    People’s Credit Banks (BPR) 1.712 
    Syariahs2 169 
Sub Total (A) 2.003 
Insurance3 144 
Stock market 499 
Bond market 184 
Security Companies 158 
Pawn office 1 
Pension Fund 406 
Financing Companies 212 
Venture Capital Firms 66 
Sub Total Non-Banks and Non-Coperatives Finansial Institutions (B) 1.670 
Total (A + B) 3.672 
Source: BI (2010e), Bapepam-LK (2009), Biro Dana Pensiun (2009), Biro Perasuransian (2008) 
1 Number of conventional Banks and Rural Banks, May 2010 
2 Syariahs covered Common Syariah Banks,  Syariah Unit Business and Rural Syariahs 
3 Insurance covered Life Insurance, Reinsurance, Social Insurane,  Civil Sevants Insurance. Indonesian National Army, Police of The Republic 
of Indonesia.  
3 The number of capital markets issuers based on first quarter data 2009 Table	  1	   reveals	   that	   the	  proportion	  of	  banking	   industry	  accounted	   for	  56.7%	  of	   the	   financial	  sector.	  Banking	   industry	  also	  dominates	   the	  share	  of	  asset	   in	   financial	   sector	   (Figure	  1).	  The	  asset	  of	  banking	  industry	  accounted	  for	  87%	  of	  the	  total	  asset,	  while	  the	  rest	  is	  contributed	  by	  
                                                      
12 BPR practices similar banking principles and their activities comprise of savings and term deposits, loans but they cannot offer 
checking account. BPR may practice conventional or Syaria banking principles. Financing companies include leasing company, 
consumer financing company, and venture capital. 
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six	   different	   nonbanking	   institutions.	   It	   is	   interesting	   to	   note	   that	   the	   share	   of	   financing	  companies	  exceed	  the	  share	  of	  other	  nonbanking	  institutions.13	  	  
 









                                                      
13 Nonbanking sector exclude cooperatives hereafter or otherwise stated. 
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Table 2. Assets and Financial Institution Activity Value  
Financial Institutions 
Assets Core Activity Value  
(Trillion rupiahs) (Trillion rupiahs)1 
2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 
Banking (A) 1,693.5 1,986.5 2,310.6 832.9 1045.7 1353.6 
Non-Bank Financial Instutions (B)       
         Venture Capital 3.0 2.8 2.1 1.5 4,7 5,0 
         Insurrance 16.2 19.1 22.7 152.9 202,3 211,2 
         Financing Companies 93.1 107.7 137.5 93.1 107,7 137,5 
         Pension Fund 77.7 91.2 90.2 75.0 88,0 86,4 
         Mutual Fund 72.1 73.1 74.1 - - - 
         Pawn Office 18.4 22.8 33.8 18.4 22,8 33,8 
         Total Non-Bank 
Financial Instutions Assets (B) 280.5 316.7 360.4 340.9 425,5 473,9 
Total Financial Sector Assets (C = 
A+B) 1,974.0 2,303.2 2,671.0 1,173.8 1471.2 1827.5 
Proportion of Banking (A/C) 85.79%	   86.25%	   86.51%	   70.96%	   71.08%	   74.07%	  
Source: compeled from BI (2010b;2009), Bapepam-LK (2009), Pawn office (2010) 
1 Value of activity based on the amount of credit (baning), loan amount (mortgage), the amount of financing (financing and venture capital 
firms), and total investment (insurance and pension funds). Financial	  sector’s	  main	  activities	  comprise	  of	  deposits,	  credits,	  financing,	  and	  investment.	  The	  value	  of	  these	  activities	  grew	  24.2%	  to	  Rp1,827.5	  trillion	  in	  2008.	  Financial	  institutions,	  which	  achieved	   the	   highest	   growth	   during	   2006-­‐2008,	   are	   venture	   capital	   (233.3%),	   pawn	   office	  (83.7%),	   and	   bank	   (62.5%).	   The	   increase	   in	   the	   value	   of	   their	   activities	   illustrates	   the	  momentous	  development	   of	   the	   sector	   in	   Indonesian	   economy.	  The	   intermediary	   role	   of	   the	  sector	  becomes	  more	  important	  as	  the	  economy’s	  gear	  shifts	  up.	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Tabel 3 Indonesian Micro Financial Institutions Profile, until 2009 
Type of Institution Number (unit) 









Formal       
 Banks (supervised by Bank Indonesia)      
  BRI (BRI, 2009) 4.029 4.918.000 130.266 30.000.000 32.000 
  Danamon DSP (Danamon, 2009) 1.200 - 12.300 - - 
  
Bank Mandiri Micro Business Unit 
(Mandiri, 2009) 976 430.000 5.400 - - 
  BTPN (BTPN, 2010) 105 160.000 250 - - 
  Bank Mega Syariah (Bank Mega, 2009) 210 - 1.000 - - 
  Bank BNI SKC (Bank BNI, 2009) 169 339.000 3.590 - - 
  BPR (March 2004) 2.296 2.718.000 25.746 5.610.000 9.254 
  BKD (Profi GTZ, 2005) 5.345 675.000 233 507.000 39 
  Total Bank (A) 14.330 9.240.000 178.785 36.117.000 41.293 
 
Cooperatives (supervised by  Small and 
Medium Enterprise Ministry, KUKM )      
  KSP (The Ministry of KUKM, 2009) 3.200 655.000 531 - 85 
  USP (The Ministry of KUKM, 2009) 66.352 - 3.629 - 1.157 
  KJKS (The Ministry of KUKM, 2009) 264 - - - - 
  UJSK (The Ministry of KUKM, 2009) 524 - - - - 
  BK3D (Desember 2003) 965 964.000 3236  199 
  BMT (Oktober 2004) 3937 1.175.000 
                
1.980  - 209 
  Credit union and NGO (Oktober 2004) 1,146 397.401 506 293.648 188 
  Total Non-bank Cooperatives (B) 76,388 3,191,401 9882 293,648 1838 
 
Non-bank  Non-Cooperative (supervisored 
by Capital Market Supervision Agency, 
Bapepam-LK)      
  Swamitra (2003) 177 32.000 127 55.000 56 
  LDKP (Profi GTZ, 2005)) 239 1.326.000 1076 - 334 
  Pawn office (Pawn office, 2009) 3.100 14.300.000 49.000 -  
  UlaMM (PNM, 2009) 184 13.021.000 800 - - 
  LKM LSM 1047 286.000 449   
  Total Nonbank Non-Koperasi (C) 4747 28,647,318 51452 55.000 1.831 
Total (X+Y) 94.320 41.078.719 240.119 36.465.648 43.521 
Sources: compiled  form Ashari (2006), The Ministry ofThe Ministry KUKM (2009), GTZ (2005); BTPN= Bank Tabungan Pensiunan Nasional; BKD = 
Badan Kredit Desa; KSP = Koperasi Simpan Pinjam; USP = Unit Simpan Pinjam; BK3D = Badan Koordinasi Koperasi Kredit Daerah; LDKP = 
Lembaga Dana Kredit Pedesaan; Kukesra = Kredit Usaha Kesejahteraan Rakyat; PNM ULMM= Permodalan Nasional Madani Unit Layanan Modal 
Mikro; KJKS=Koperasi Jasa Keuangan Syariah; UJSK=Unit Jasa Syariah Koperasi.	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Microfinancial	   services	  also	  play	  vital	   role	   in	   the	  development	  of	   financial	   sector.	  Their	  asset	  may	   not	   be	   as	   big	   as	   the	   big	   players,	   but	   they	   serve	   a	   vast	  market,	   particularly	  middle	   and	  lower	  income	  communities.	  There	  are	  94,320	  microfinancial	  services	  across	  the	  country	  which	  serves	  more	  than	  36	  million	  customers	  in	  2009	  (Table	  3).	  Caution	  should	  be	  taken	  in	  analyzing	  the	   data	   since	   the	   data	   may	   not	   revealed	   the	   factual	   figure;	   many	   firms	   have	   not	   been	  accounted	   due	   to	   lack	   of	   information.	   There	   are	   also	  many	   informal	   institutions	   that	   collect	  fund	  from	  the	  society	  such	  as	  social	  gathering	  known	  as	  arisan	  and	  loan	  sharks	  that	  typically	  target	  small	  business.	  
Tabel 4: The Profile of Indonesian Microfinance Programs, until 2003  







Programs    
 Kukesra (Juni 2002) - 10.300.000 754 
 PPK (Desember 2002) 15.481 300.000 243 
 P4K (Mei 2002) 15.481 300.000 243 
 P2KP (September 2003) 2.227 3.200.000 500 
 PKM (Juni 2003) 1.140 2.300.000 649 
 PEMP (Desember 2003)1 481.000 - 308 
 IMS-NTAADP (Desember (2003) 214 58.000 42 
 IMS SAADP 592 94.000 100 
 Total Program 35.135 17.033.000 2.839 
Source: compiled form Ashari (2006); Kukesra = Kredit Usaha Kesejahteraan Rakyat (People’s Walfare Business Credit) ;PPK = Program 
Pengembangan Kecamatan(Sub-district Development Program); P4K = Pembinaan Peningkatan Pendapatan Petani dan nelayan Kecil(Small Farmers 
Income Generating Project); P2KP = Program Penanggulangan Kemiskinan di Perkotaan(Poverty Alleviation Project in Urban Areas); PKM = 
Pendidikan Kewirausahaan Masyarakat(Enterpreneurship Education Program); PEMP = Pemberdayaan Ekonomi Masyarakat Pesisir(Littoral 
Community Economic Empowerment); IMS = Inisiatif Masyarakat Setempat(Local Community Initiative). Government-­‐initiated	  loan	  programmes	  are	  also	  part	  of	  the	  country’s	  nonbanking	  sector.	  The	  assets	  and	  activities	  may	  not	  be	  as	  big	  as	  those	  of	  banking	  sector	  but	  they	  serve	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  customers,	  especially	  in	  remote	  areas.	  These	  programme	  are	  also	  vital	  in	  lifting	  the	  social	   welfare	   as	   they	   target	   poor	   communities.	   There	   are	   35,135	   programmes	   whispread	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across	   regions	   as	   shown	   by	   Ashari	   (2006).	   Those	   programmes	   serve	   more	   than	   16	   million	  customers	  with	  total	  loans	  of	  Rp2.8	  trillion	  (Table	  4).	  	  There	  are	  several	  questions	  which	  may	  be	  raised	  in	  accordance	  with	  microfinance.	  Who	  is	   in	  charge	  of	  supervising	  the	   industry?	  Does	  the	  supervision	  by	  the	  authority	   include	  all	  existing	  form	  of	   financial	   institution?	  The	   financial	  sector	   is	  currently	  supervised	  by	  three	  regulators:	  Bank	  of	  Indonesia,	  Bapepam-­‐LK	  (Capital	  Market	  and	  Financial	  Institution	  Supervision	  Agency),	  and	  The	   State	  Ministry	   of	   Cooperatives	   and	   Small	   and	  Medium	  Enterprises	   (The	  Ministry	   of	  KUKM	  hereafter).	  Bank	  of	  Indonesia	  is	  responsible	  in	  regulating	  and	  supervising	  bank	  and	  BPR.	  Bapepam-­‐LK	   takes	   charge	   in	   the	   supervision	   of	   insurance	   companies,	   pension	   fund,	   pawn	  office,	   and	   financing	   companies.	   The	   Ministry	   of	   KUKM	   is	   mainly	   in	   charge	   in	   supervising	  cooperatives,	  credit	  unions	  and	  baitul	  mal	  wat	  tamwil	  (BMT).14	  Bank	  of	   Indonesia,	   the	   country’s	  monetary	  authority,	  has	  a	   central	   role	   in	   the	   supervision	  of	  financial	   sector	   as	   a	   whole	   through	   macroprudential	   supervision	   and	   banks	   in	   particular	  through	   microprudential	   supervision.	   Macroprudential	   supervision	   authorizes	   Bank	   of	  Indonesia	   to	   oversee	   the	   activity	   of	   financial	   supervision	   as	   a	   whole.	   On	   the	   other	   side,	  microprudential	   supervision	   empowers	   Bank	   of	   Indonesia	   to	   oversee	   the	   performance	   and	  conduct-­‐of-­‐business	   of	   banks,	   ensuring	   the	   wellbeing	   of	   each	   bank	   in	   the	   industry.	   Bank	   of	  Indonesia	   practices	   microprudential	   supervision	   to	   banking	   through	   on-­‐	   and	   off-­‐site	  supervision.	  These	  activities	  are	  performed	  by	  42	  offices	  across	  Indonesia.	  	  The	  Ministry	  of	  KUKM	  has	  the	  role	  of	  supervising	  cooperative	  which	  comprise	  of	  credit	  union	  and	   Baitul	   Maal	   Wat	   Tamwil	   (BMT	   hereafter).	   There	   are	   about	   76,000	   cooperatives	   with	  annual	   revenue	   of	   Rp55	   trillion.	   The	   Ministry	   of	   KUKM	   has	   497	   regional	   offices	   in	   across	  Indonesia	   which	   is	   referred	   as	   Disperindag	   (Trade,	   Industry,	   and	   Cooperative	   Agency).	   The	  major	  challenge	  that	  The	  Ministry	  of	  KUKM	  faces	  is	  the	  lack	  of	  microprudential	  supervision	  to	  cooperatives.	   Even	   though	   a	   failure	   of	   a	   cooperative	   will	   not	   be	   detrimental	   to	   the	   whole	  economy,	  the	  impact	  to	  a	  particular	  community	  might	  be	  devastating.	  
                                                      
14 BMT is a syariah-based microfinance. The BMT does not follow cooperatives principles, conversely, BMT has 
characteristic similar to that of banks.Thus, BMT possesses systemic risk too. However, the GOI decided to categorize 
BMT as a cooperative-based microfinance.  
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  Figure	  2:	  Structure	  of	  Financial	  Sector	  Supervision	  In	  contrast	   to	   the	  other	  two	  regulators,	  Bapepam-­‐LK	  oversees	  more	  diverse	   financial	  entities	  including	   stock	  market,	   insurance,	   pension	   fund,	   pawn	   office,	   and	   financing	   companies.	   The	  regulator	   supervises	   a	   total	   of	   1,670	   financial	   entities.	   They	   also	   have	   the	   responsibility	   to	  supervise	   4,747	   microfinancial	   entities.	   Surprisingly,	   the	   burden	   of	   supervision	   activities	   is	  conducted	  through	  a	  single	  office	  only,	  as	  Bapepam-­‐LK	  is	  only	  situated	  in	  Jakarta.	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	   other	   two	   regulators,	   Bapepam-­‐LK	   has	   a	   special	   right	   to	   investigate	   and	   prosecute	  institutions	   they	   supervise.	   Nevertheless,	   a	   huge	   blind	   spot	   in	   the	   coverage	   of	   Bapepam-­‐LK	  supervision	   may	   hinder	   the	   Bapepam-­‐LK	   to	   have	   a	   good	   performance	   in	   supervising	   non-­‐cooperative	  and	  non-­‐banking	  financial	  institutions.	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Figure	  2	   suggest	   that	   the	   structure	  of	   financial	   sector	   supervision	   in	   Indonesia	  has	  not	  been	  thoroughly	  designed.	  The	  current	  structure	  creates	  an	  enormous	  no	  man’s	  land	  of	  supervision	  in	  the	  sector.	  First,	  there	  are	  many	  financial	  institutions	  which	  are	  yet	  to	  be	  supervised	  by	  the	  existing	   regulators,	   particularly	   Bapepam-­‐LK	   and	   The	   Ministry	   of	   KUKM.	   Nonbanking	  institutions	  are	  ideally	  supervised	  by	  Bapepam-­‐LK	  however	  there	  is	  a	  doubt	  that	  Bapepam-­‐LK	  has	  sufficient	  infrastructure	  to	  perform	  financial	  supervision	  in	  all	  regions,	  considering	  the	  fact	  that	  Bapepam-­‐LK	  does	  not	  have	  any	  regional	  office.	  This	  circumstance	  hinders	  Bapepam-­‐LK	  to	  carry	   out	   thorough	   supervision,	   particularly	   microprudential	   supervision.	   It	   is	   essentially	  impractical,	   if	   we	   cannot	   say	   a	   herculean	   task,	   for	   Bapepam-­‐LK	   to	   perform	   on-­‐	   and	   off-­‐site	  supervision.15	  Second,	   the	   supervision	   arrangements	   of	   three	   existing	   institutions	   are	   essentially	   different.	  This	   may	   not	   seem	   to	   be	   a	   problem	   if	   each	   regulator	   supervises	   institutions	   with	   similar	  characteristic.	   In	   practice	   however,	   many	   institutions	   with	   similar	   characteristic	   has	   been	  supervised	  by	  different	  regulators.	  Bank	  of	  Indonesia	  tends	  to	  implement	  prudential	  principle	  in	   their	   supervision	   activities	   while	   Bapepam-­‐LK	   applies	   conformity-­‐to-­‐rule	   principle.	  Bapepam-­‐LK’s	  principle	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  effective	  for	  the	  stock	  market,	  however,	  it	  may	  not	  be	   the	   case	   for	   nonbanking	   institutions.	   The	   rationale	   is	   that	   the	   majority	   of	   nonbanking	  activities	  are	   in	   fact	   similar	   to	  banking	   thus	   it	  possesses	  systemic	   risk	   from	  their	  activities.16	  The	  Ministry	  of	  KUKM	  tends	  to	  focus	  on	  cooperative	  principles	  in	  their	  supervision	  approach,	  however	  the	  measures	  may	  not	  be	  effective	  in	  supervising	  credit	  union	  and	  BMT,	  which	  have	  similar	  characteristics	  to	  banking	  institution	  as	  oppose	  to	  that	  of	  cooperative.	  Third,	   there	   is	   a	   discrepancy	   in	   the	   quality	   of	   supervision	   between	   the	   three	   existing	  institutions.	  Bank	  Indonesia	  is	  the	  only	  one	  that	  is	  able	  to	  perform	  thorough	  supervision,	  both	  on-­‐	   and	   off-­‐,	   to	   each	   and	   every	   institution.	   This	   situation	   creates	   a	   loophole	   in	   the	   financial	  industry:	   investors	   tend	   to	   establish	   non-­‐banking	   institutions	   or	   cooperatives	   where	  supervision	   is	   relatively	   loose.	   The	   effect	   of	   this	   situation	   is	   the	   ever-­‐growing	   numbers	   of	  entrants	   in	   the	   non-­‐banking	   industry.	   The	   main	   concern	   is	   a	   tendency	   of	   increasing	   the	  
                                                      
15 Historically, Bapepam was established to supervise the stock market. Later on, Bapepam was assigned to supervise 
non-banking institutions. Significant increase in supervision burden, however, was not matched with major improvement 
in infrastructures and resources.  
16 We may argue that insurance is not included in this instance 
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likelihood	   of	   systemic	   failure	   as	   some	   institutions	   in	   non-­‐banking	   industry	   possess	   systemic	  risk,	  e.g.	  BMT.	  
3. OJK:	  Its	  Structure	  and	  Complexity	  According	  to	  OJK	  Draft	  Act,	  the	  role	  of	  OJK	  is	  to	  supervise	  all	  financial	  institutions	  that	  accept	  funds	  from	  third	  party.	   	  It	  is	  apparent	  that	  the	  scope	  of	  OJK’s	  supervision	  is	  vast	  and	  it	  seems	  too	  ambitious,	  as	  stated	  in	  article	  34	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  Indonesia	  Act:	  
The	  financial	  services	  authority	  which	  will	  be	  established	  perform	  supervision	  in	  banking	  
and	   other	   financial	   services	   such	   as	   insurance,	   pension	   fund,	   security,	   venture	   capital,	  
financial	  capital,	  and	  other	  entity	  that	  accepts	  deposits	  from	  the	  public.	  	  The	   same	   scope	   has	   been	   defined	   in	   article	   1	   of	   OJK	  Draft	   Cct.	   In	   addition,	   the	   definition	   of	  nonbanking	  institution	  as	  stated	  in	  article	  1,	  verse	  7	  of	  OJK	  Draft	  Act	  	  is	  given	  as	  follows:	  	  
Nonbanking	   financial	   industry	   is	   referred	   as	   financial	   services	   by	   financial	   institutions	  
other	  than	  banking	  which	  comprise	  of	  pension	  fund,	  financing	  institution,	  credit	  insurance,	  
pawn,	   other	   institutions	   that	   arrange	   social	   insurance	   and	  mandatory	  welfare	   program,	  
and	  other	  nonbanking	  financial	  industries.	  	  The	  article	  1	  of	  OJK	  Draft	  Act	  implies	  that	  OJK	  will	  supervise	  all	  institutions	  in	  both	  banking	  and	  non-­‐banking	  sector,	   irrespective	  whether	  the	  institution	  is	   in	  the	  form	  of	  cooperative	  or	  non-­‐cooperative,	  whether	  the	  institution	  is	  based	  on	  syariah	  or	  conventional	  financial	  system,	  and	  whether	   the	  scale	  of	   the	   institution	   is	   large	  or	  micro.	   Indeed,	   the	  scope	  of	  supervision	  which	  would	  be	  conducted	  by	  OJK	  is	  unprecedentedly	  vast,	  if	  not	  overtly	  ambitious.	  	  Figure	  3	  illustrates	  the	  mechanism	  of	  unification	  of	  Bapepam-­‐LK	  and	  Bank	  Indonesia	  into	  OJK.	  The	   unification	   process	   into	   OJK	   is	   pretty	   straightforward;	   banking	   supervision	   division	   in	  Bank	   Indonesia	   will	   be	   merged	   with	   nonbanking	   and	   stock	   market	   supervision	   division	   in	  Bapepam-­‐LK.	   Obviously	   both	   Bank	   of	   Indonesia	   and	   Bapepam-­‐LK	   have	   their	   own	   standard	  operating	  procedure	  and	  code	  of	  conduct	  in	  supervision.	  The	  Draft	  Act,	  however,	  has	  not	  stated	  the	  mechanism	   on	   how	   the	   process	   of	   unification	   of	   both	   divisions	   in	  OJK.	   According	   to	   the	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Draft	   Act,	   OJK	   has	   been	   designed	   using	   integrated	   approach,	   similar	   to	   financial	   service	  authorities	  in	  the	  UK,	  Japan	  and	  South	  Korea.17	  	  	  
 
Figure 3. Transfer of Functions of Financial Sector Supervision to OJK Figure	   4	   shows	   the	   organisational	   structure	   of	  OJK	   as	   proposed	   in	   the	  Draft	   Act.	   A	   board	   of	  commissioner	  would	  be	   in	  charge	  of	  OJK.	  The	  board	  would	  oversee	   three	  head	  of	  executives	  which	  would	  supervise	  banking	  industry,	  nonbanking	  industry,	  and	  stock	  market.	  The	  head	  of	  executives	  would	   be	   assisted	   by	   five	   deputies	   and	  managing	   director.	   Their	   tasks	   alongside	  head	  of	  executives	  are	  to	  perform	  microprudential	  and	  conduct-­‐of-­‐business	  supervision.	  	  Idealy	  the	  members	  of	  the	  committee	  should	  consists	  of	  representatives	  from	  Bank	  Indonesia	  and	   Bapepam-­‐LK,	   as	   they	   have	   a	   long	   track	   record	   in	   financial	   supervision.	   There	   is	   no	  certainty,	   however,	   that	   this	   ideal	   formation	   will	   be	   embraced	   in	   OJK.	   	   There	   is	   a	   strong	  tendency	  among	  members	  of	  the	  parliament	  who	  propose	  that	  the	  members	  of	  the	  committee	  should	  be	  bureaucrats.	  Instead,	  the	  members	  of	  the	  committee	  should	  be	  from	  society,	  who	  are	  not	  bureaucrats.	  	  	  A	  serious	  problem	  will	  be	  emerged	  if	   the	   latter	   idea	  would	  be	  embraced	  in	  OJK.	   It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  according	  to	   the	  Draft	  Act,	   the	  house	  of	  representative	  has	  a	  right	   to	  conduct	  a	   fit	  and	  proper	  test	  and	  subsequently	  choose	  the	  members	  of	  the	  committee.	  If	  the	  members	  of	  the	  committee	  do	  not	  represent	  any	  financial	  supervision	  institution,	  the	  question	  is	  whether	  the	  
                                                      
17 Recently, the structure of financial services supervision tends to move away from integrated approach. Supervision of 
banks and insurance in UK has been reassigned away from FSA to Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) which is a 
subsidiary of Bank of England (Bank of England and FSA, 2011). Lawmakers in South Korea also support the 
assignment of Bank of Korea as supervisory authority for financial services (Kim, 2011).  
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members	   of	   the	   committee	   have	   a	   sufficient	   credential	   to	   hold	   the	   position?	   	   Even	   if	   the	  members	  of	  the	  committee	  have	  the	  credential	  required,	  however,	  it	  can	  be	  ascertain	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  members	  were	  ex	  practitions	  in	  financial	  sector.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  impartiality	  of	  the	  members	  to	  particular	  groups	  where	  they	  previously	  worked	  with	  is	  questionable.	  	  Further	  serious	  problem	  will	  be	  emerged	  if	  some	  or	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  members	  have	  close	  connection	  to	  political	  parties.	  	  	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  also	  that	  the	  house	  of	  representative	  has	  a	  right	  to	  monitor	  and	  to	  supervise	  the	   executives.	   In	   this	   case,	   all	   OJK	   officers,	   including	   the	   members	   of	   committee,	   are	   the	  executives	  whom	  are	  supervised	  and	  monitored	  by	  the	  house	  of	  representative.	  A	  complexity	  will	   be	   emerged	   since	   the	  house	  of	   representative	  has	   responsible	   to	   conduct	   fit	   and	  proper	  test,	  to	  choose	  the	  members	  of	  the	  committee	  and	  to	  minitor	  and	  to	  supervise	  the	  OJK	  including	  the	   members	   of	   the	   committee.	   Accordingly,	   the	   impartiality	   of	   members	   of	   the	   house	   of	  representative	  in	  supervising	  and	  monitoring	  thoroughly	  the	  OJK	  is	  questionable.	  	  
Figure	  4:	  The	  Organisational	  Structure	  of	  OJK	  
Board	  of	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According	  to	  the	  Draft	  Act,	  OJK	  would	  be	  given	  the	  right	  to	  investigate	  financial	  institutions	  and	  file	  prosecution	  if	  necessary.	  Currently,	  Bapepam-­‐LK	  is	  the	  only	  regulator	  that	  retains	  the	  right.	  Bank	  Indonesia	  and	  the	  Ministry	  of	  KUKM,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  must	  report	  any	  illegal	  practices	  to	   the	   law	   enforcement	   agency,	   i.e.	   police.	   The	   law	   enforcement	   does	   not	   have	   adequate	  resources	   to	   deal	   with	   crime	   in	   finance.	   Thus,	   the	   investigation	   and	   prosecution	   need	  prolonged	  period	  and	   loopholes	  may	  arise.	  The	   fact	   that	  OJK	   is	  given	   the	   right	   to	   investigate	  will	  help	  promoting	  compliance	  from	  the	  supervised	  institutions.	  	  	  Article	   37	   of	   OJK	   Draft	   Act	   asserts	   that	   OJK	   is	   responsible	   to	   hold	   coordination	   with	   Bank	  Indonesia,	  Ministry	  of	  Treasury,	  and	  Indonesia	  Deposit	  Insurance	  Company	  Cooperation	  (LPS	  hereafter).	  The	  coordination	  will	  be	  facilitated	  in	  a	  forum	  referred	  as	  Financial	  Sector	  Stability	  Forum	   (FSSK).	   The	   concern	   is	   that	   the	   OJK	   Draft	   Act	   does	   not	   explicitly	   state	   the	   detail	   of	  coordination	   that	  must	  be	  done	  by	   the	   four	   institutions.	   In	  particular,	   there	   is	  no	  agreement	  regarding	   responsibility	  of	   each	   institution	   in	   the	   time	  of	   crisis.	  This	  might	   lead	   to	   “pass	   the	  bucket”	  behavior	  which	  is	  not	  ideal.	  	  
Articles 30-33 of OJK Draft Act discuss the method of financing OJK. In the first three years of 
transitional period, the costs of OJK would be bourne by both Bank of Indonesia and Bappepam. 
After the period, the supervision costs would be bourne by each financial institution in financial 
sector. Each supervised institution has to pay fees to OJK. The imposition of fee will be unique to 
each firm by considering its asset, profit, cash flow, and equity. Fees that will be imposed are permit 
fee, approval fee, registration fee, supervision fee, inspection fee, and many more. The fees obtained 
from the industry can only fund operational activities and the surplus will form reserve. This reserve 
can only be invested in government bond or Bank Indonesia certificates.	  
There	   are	   several	   issues	   which	   should	   be	   discussed	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   structure	   of	   OJK	   as	  described	  in	  the	  Draft	  Act.	  Some	  complexities	   in	  the	  establishment	  of	  OJK	  are	  as	  follows:	   	  (1)	  the	   scope	   of	   OJK	   which	   is	   to	   vast	   and	   their	   supervision	   practices	   are	   inconsistent;	   (2)	   the	  regulatory	  task	  that	  rather	  neglect	  macroprudential	  supervision;	  (3)	  problematic	  role	  of	  Bank	  Indonesia	  as	  the	  lender	  of	  the	  last	  resort;	  (4)	  there	  is	  no	  sufficient	  details	  in	  the	  coordination	  measures	  among	  related	  regulators;	   (5)	  weak	  argument	   in	   the	   imposition	  of	   fee	   to	   fund	  OJK;	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(6)	  potency	  that	  Law	  of	  OJK	  run	  into	  other	  established	  Law	  such	  as	  Law	  of	  Bank	  Indonesia,	  Law	  of	  Bank,	  and	  several	  more.	  	  There	  is	  an	  issue	  in	  the	  scope	  of	  supervision	  of	  OJK	  which	  does	  not	  include	  cooperatives.	  Any	  cooperative-­‐based	  financial	  institution	  will	  still	  be	  supervised	  by	  The	  Ministry	  of	  KUKM.	  This	  is	  inconsistent	  and	  contradicts	  with	  the	  proposed	  scope	  of	  OJK	  in	  article	  1	  of	  OJK	  Draft	  Act	  that	  OJK	   would	   supervise	   all	   forms	   of	   financial	   institutions.	   The	   issue	   will	   not	   be	   crucial	   if	   the	  number	  of	  cooperatives	  is	  small.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  fact	  shows	  the	  contrary;	  there	  are	  as	  many	  as	  71,000	  cooperatives	  in	  Indonesia	  and	  their	  assets	  reached	  Rp55	  trilion	  annually	  It	  is	  surprising	  that	  the	  role	  of	  OJK	  does	  not	  really	  focus	  on	  macroprudential	  supervision	  in	  the	  financial	   industry.	   Banking	   industry	   has	   the	   biggest	   share	   in	   Indonesia	   financial	   sector	  portfolio;	   hence,	   the	   industry	   inherently	   possesses	   systemic	   risk.	   Nonbanking	   financial	  industry’s	   share	   in	   the	   portfolio	   is	   relatively	   small;	   however,	   their	   activities	   have	   expanded	  vastly	   and	   penetrated	   the	  market	   rather	   deep.	   There	   is	   a	   strong	   tendency	   that	   nonbanking	  financial	  institutions	  has	  opened	  their	  branch	  offices	  across	  Indonesia,	  therefore,	  the	  industry	  also	   presents	   systemic	   risk.	   This	   argument	   addresses	   the	   importance	   of	   macroprudential	  supervision	  throughout	  all	  financial	  industry.	  	  Bank	  of	  Indonesia	  has	  been	  the	  lender	  of	  the	  last	  resort	  for	  banking	  industry	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	   performs	   macroprudential	   supervision.	   Bank	   of	   Indonesia	   performs	   on-­‐	   and	   off-­‐site	  supervision	  and	  closely	  monitors	  real	  time	  data	  to	  keep	  track	  of	  the	  industry’s	  wellbeing	  from	  time	   to	   time.	  The	   issue	   that	  might	  arise	   is	   that	  whether	  Bank	  of	   Indonesia	  still	  has	  sufficient	  access	  and	  data	  to	  banking	  industry	  if	  its	  supervision	  is	  transferred	  to	  OJK.	  This	  will	  definitely	  create	  a	  gap	  between	  Bank	  Indonesia	  and	  necessary	  data	   to	  perform	  their	   tasks.	  This	   is	  very	  risky	  as	  witnessed	  in	  United	  Kingdom	  during	  recent	  financial	  crisis.	  Bank	  of	  England	  could	  not	  obtain	  sufficient	  data	  regarding	  Northern	  Rock	  Bank.	  Once	  they	  were	  able	  to	  obtain	  the	  data,	  Northern	  Rock	  had	  already	  collapsed.	  	  There	   is	   urgency	   for	   coordination	   between	   the	   four	   institutions.	   However,	   such	   will	   not	   be	  optimal	   if	   there	   is	   no	   legal	   detail	   regarding	   the	   coordination.	   In	   the	  world	   of	   bureaucracy—particularly	   in	   Indonesia—coordination	   between	   two	   agencies	   is	   very	   impractical.	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Coordination	  only	  means	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  meeting	  without	  any	  arrangement	  of	  responsibility	  and	  measures	  for	  each	  responsibility.	  	  
Pradiptyo	   et	   al.	   (2010)	   establish	   a	   prisoner’s	   dilemma	   experiment	   with	   random	   matching	  players	   and	  payoff	  perturbation.	  The	  experiment	  was	   completed	  at	  Universitas	  Gadjah	  Mada	  involving	   academic	   civics.	   The	   results	   show	   staggering	   insights:	   the	   portion	   of	   cooperation	  throughout	   game	   never	   exceeds	   2%.	   The	   results	   differ	   significantly	   to	   that	   of	   previous	  researches	  such	  as	  Selten	  and	  Stoecker	  (1986)	  and	  Cooper	  et	  al.	  (1996).	  The	  implication	  of	  the	  result	   is	  straightforward,	   the	  subjects	  have	   lower	   tendency	  to	  cooperate	  compare	  to	   those	   in	  other	  countries.	  Frankly,	  coordination	  is	  easily	  said	  than	  done	  in	  Indonesia.	  	  
Supervision	  mission	  by	  Bank	  Indonesia,	  Bapepam-­‐LK,	  and	  the	  Ministry	  of	  KUKM	  has	  the	  nature	  of	  public	  goods.	  It	  is	  nonexcludable	  and	  nonrivalry	  for	  all	  financial	  institutions.	  The	  implication	  is	  that	  the	  future	  supervision	  authority	  will	  regulate	  all	  institutions	  without	  imposing	  any	  fee.	  There	   will	   be	   a	   query	   if	   the	   fee	   is	   imposed	   to	   the	   industry	   that	   is	   whether	   the	   fee	   will	   be	  financed	   by	   tax	   or	   retribution.	   If	   the	   fee	   is	   considered	   as	   tax,	   then	   there	   may	   be	   a	   double	  taxation	  imposition	  to	  financial	  industry	  as	  each	  institution	  has	  already	  paid	  income	  tax.	  There	  are	   several	   questions	  which	  may	   be	   raised	   if	   the	   fee	   is	   considered	   as	   tax.	   How	  will	   the	   tax	  effects	  the	  welfare	  of	  the	  economy?	  Who	  will	  bear	  the	  burden	  of	  the	  tax?	  	  
Supervision	  mission	  of	  OJK	  will	  switch	  to	  common	  resources	  if	  the	  fee	  imposed	  is	  in	  the	  form	  of	  retribution.	   If	   the	   fee	   is	   considered	   as	   a	   retribution,	   the	   immediate	   question	   which	   can	   be	  raised	   is	   that	   what	   is	   the	   immediate	   benefits	   which	   would	   be	   received	   by	   the	   supervised	  institutions?	  	  The	  nature	  of	  the	  fee	  will	  transform	  financial	  supervision	  from	  public	  goods	  to	  be	  common	   resources.	   This	   implies	   that	   OJK	   does	   not	   have	   the	   compulsion	   to	   supervise	   that	  institution	   if	   a	   particular	   institution	   is	   not	   willing	   to	   pay	   for	   the	   fee.	   The	   outcome	   of	   such	  scheme	  is	  rather	  counter	  intuitive.	  
The	  imposement	  of	  fee	  to	  the	  supervised	  institutions	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  flourish	  corruptions	  in	  financial	  supervision	  in	  practice.	  Under	  the	  scheme,	  bribery	  as	  well	  as	  extortion	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  the	  possible	  outcome.	  The	  fact	  that	  organized	  crime	  and	  conglomeration	  have	  been	  growing	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stronger	   creates	   further	   complexity	   to	   the	   scheme.	   As	   long	   as	   supervision	   of	   the	   industry	   is	  transactional,	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  OJK	  is	  questioned	  and	  corruption	  within	  OJK	  would	  flourish.	  	  
Further	  complexity	  that	  may	  arise	  in	  the	  establishment	  of	  OJK	  is	  the	  contradiction	  between	  OJK	  Draft	  Act	  with	  other	  established	  Acts	  given	  below.	  
1. Banking	  Act,	  No.	  10/1998	  2. Bank	  of	  Indonesia	  Act,	  No.	  6/2009	  	  3. Cooperatives	  act,	  No.	  25/1992	  	  4. Stock	  market	  act,	  No.	  8/1995	  	  5. Insurance	  act,	  No.	  2/1992	  	  6. Presidential	  Decree	  No.	  9/2009	  regarding	  Financial	  Institutions.	  The	  immediate	  solution	  is	  the	  amendment	  of	  the	  established	  Acts	  to	  conform	  to	  OJK	  Act.	  The	  history	  suggests,	  however,	  that	  an	  amendment	  to	  a	  particular	  Act	  is	  far	  from	  a	  straightforward	  effort	  since	  it	  may	  take	  years.	  For	  example,	  establishment	  of	  Money	  Laundering	  Act	  took	  four	  years	  in	  the	  legislation.	  The	  Draft	  Act	  was	  proposed	  to	  the	  legislation	  in	  2006	  and	  became	  one	  of	   the	  priorities	  of	   the	   legislation	   in	  2007.	  Nonetheless,	   the	  discussion	  of	   the	  Draft	  Act	  never	  reaches	   to	   a	   conclusion	   until	   October	   2010.	   This	   incidence	   suggests	   that	   amendment	   of	   the	  established	  Acts	  related	  to	  financial	  industry	  will	  not	  be	  immediate.	  
4. Estimated	  Costs	  of	  OJK	  The	   establishment	   costs	   of	   OJK	  will	   certainly	   be	   a	   very	   expensive	   lunch.	   The	   costs	   not	   only	  consist	  of	   accounting	  cost	   such	  as	  operational	   cost	  but	  also	  economic	   cost	   such	  as	   transition	  costs.	  We	  estimate	  the	  costs	  of	  establishment	  strictly	  within	  the	  boundary	  of	  OJK	  Draft	  Act.	  The	  category	  of	  the	  establishment	  costs	  is	  given	  below.	  	  1. Fixed	  establishment	  cost	  of	  OJK	  as	  mandated	  by	  the	  Draft	  Act.	  The	  investment	  includes	  costs	   of	   establishing	   regional	   offices,	   recruiting	   human	   resources,	   and	   establishing	  information	  and	  technology	  (IT)	  system.	  The	  cost	  also	   includes	  the	  changeover	  cost	  of	  banking	  supervision	  IT	  system	  from	  Bank	  of	  Indonesia	  to	  OJK.	  2. Operational	  cost	  of	  OJK	  as	  mandated	  by	  the	  Draft	  Act.	  The	  cost	  includes	  all	  expenses	  in	  the	  supervision	  of	  financial	  industry	  such	  as	  training	  cost	  for	  field	  supervisors,	  on-­‐	  and	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off-­‐site	   supervision	   of	   financial	   institutions,	   wages,	   maintenance	   cost,	   and	   cost	   of	  operating	  IT.	  Two	  costs	  described	  above	  are	  tangible	  and	  observable.	  There	  is	  also	  possibility	  of	  intangible	  and	   unobservable	   cost	   in	   the	   establishment	   of	   OJK.	   Caution	   should	   be	   taken	   during	   the	  transition	  period	  of	   banking	   supervision	   from	  Bank	  of	   Indonesia	   to	  OJK,	   since	   it	  may	  hinder	  costs.	  The	  cost	  includes	  the	  loss	  of	  tacit	  knowledge	  of	  banking	  supervision	  by	  the	  institution.	  	  The	  establishment	  and	  operation	  cost	  of	  OJK	  can	  be	  classified	   into	  short-­‐term	  and	   long-­‐term	  cost.	  The	  short-­‐term	  cost	  includes	  the	  following	  details.	  1. Establishment	  and	  transition	  cost	  of	  IT	  system	  2. Recruitment	  cost	  of	  human	  resource	  3. Training	  cost	  of	  field	  supervisors	  4. Establishment	  cost	  of	  regional	  offices	  5. Establishment	  cost	  of	  organizational	  blueprint	  and	  standard	  procedures	  6. Contingency	  cost	  of	  economic	  vulnerability	  during	  transition	  The	  long-­‐term	  cost	  of	  establishing	  OJK	  includes	  the	  following	  details.	  1. Reluctance	  of	  established	  banking	  supervisors	  in	  Bank	  of	  Indonesia	  to	  be	  incorporated	  to	  OJK.	  2. Loss	  of	   tacit	  knowledge	  concerning	  supervising	   technique	  and	  system	  which	  has	  been	  long	  established.	  3. Sharp	  increase	  in	  operational	  cost	  due	  to	  the	  enormous	  number	  of	  financial	  institutions	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  supervised.	  4. The	   cost	   of	   amending	   established	  Law	  which	  will	   be	  necessary	   since	   inconsistency	  of	  Draft	  Law	  of	  OJK	  with	  established	  Law	  is	  perceptible.	  	  We	  summarize	  our	  argument	  of	  establishment	  costs,	  particularly	  the	  short-­‐term	  costs,	  in	  Table	  5.	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Table 5. Type of Transisition of Supervision of the existing regulators to OJK  
Transition	  costs	  
Type	   Arguments	  
Establishment	   cost	   of	   IT	  system	   for	   OJK	   and	  transition	   cost	   of	  switching	   IT	   system	   from	  Bank	  Indonesia	  
	  	  The	   existing	   IT	   system	   in	   Bank	   Indonesia	   is	   designed	   to	   monitor	   banking	  industry	   which	   includes	   122	   banks	   with	   3,041	   offices	   and	   1,861	   BPR.	  	  OJK	  must	  establish	  IT	  system	  that	  supports	  comprehensive	  data	  from	  the	  industry	  which	   consists	   of	   1,670	   nonbanking	   institutions	   and	   a	   staggering	   86,504	  nonbanking	  microfinancial	  services	  (as	  of	  2009).	  
Recruitment	   cost	   of	   human	  resources	  	  
Assuming	   all	   bank	   supervisors	   from	   Bank	   Indonesia	   join	   OJK,	   the	   institution	  needs	  to	  recruit	  additional	  staffs	  to	  supervise	  86,504	  nonbanking	  institutions.	  These	   supervisors	   will	   perform	   on-­‐	   and	   off-­‐	   supervision	   of	   banking	   and	  nonbanking	  institutions.	  The	  assumption	  however	   is	  not	   too	   realistic.	  The	  more	   sensible	  approach	   is	   to	  assume	  10%-­‐20%	  of	  banking	  supervisors	   from	  Bank	   Indonesia	  will	   refuse	   to	  join	  OJK.	  Training	   cost	   of	   new	  supervisors	   and	   advanced	  training	   cost	   for	   established	  supervisors	  
The	   additional	   supervising	   burden	   of	   86,504	   institutions	   induces	   the	   need	   of	  additional	  staffs.	  These	  additional	  staffs	  need	  to	  be	  trained	  according	  to	  their	  role	   in	   the	   organization.	   Note	   that	   one	   staff	   has	   to	   pursue	  multiple	   levels	   of	  training	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  the	  “know-­‐how.”	  	  Establishment	   cost	   of	   regional	  offices	   which	   includes	   land-­‐acquisition	   cost,	   building-­‐construction	   cost,	   furnishing	  cost,	   and	   other	   cost	   of	   assets	  such	  as	  vehicle	  purchase.	  
OJK	   will	   not	   only	   operate	   in	   headquarter	   office	   but	   also	   in	   the	   regions.	   Such	  scope	  of	  operation	  is	  necessary	  to	  practice	  microprudential	  supervision	  which	  includes	   on-­‐	   and	   off-­‐site	   supervisions.	   Regional	   offices	   must	   be	   able	   to	  accommodate	   supervision	   activities	   of	   86,504	   financial	   institutions.	   This	  scenario	  assumes	  Bank	  Indonesia	  performs	  banking	  supervision.	  
Establishment	   cost	   of	  organizational	   blueprint	   and	  standard	  of	  procedure	   The	  establishment	  of	  these	  features	  is	  important	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  scope	  and	  size	  of	  OJK.	  These	  features	  will	  be	  important	  to	  avoid	  any	  unnecessary	  dispute.	  The	  average	  time	  needed	  for	  government	  institutions	  such	  as	  LPS	  (Indonesia	  Credit	  Insurance	  Cooperation),	  KPK	   (Corruption	  Eradication	  Commissioner),	  PPATK	  (Indonesia	   Financial	   Transaction	  Reports	   and	  Analysis),	   and	  BNPB	   (National	  Board	  of	  Disaster	  Management)	  is	  one	  to	  two	  years.	  Note	  that	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  organization	  may	  not	  be	  optimal	  during	  the	  establishment	  process	  of	  the	  organizational	  blueprint.	  Vulnerability	  of	  the	  economy	  to	  potential	  crisis	   OJK	  is	  responsible	  for	  macro-­‐	  and	  micro	  supervision	  as	  well	  as	  business	  conduct	  supervision.	  Hence,	  OJK	  is	  expected	  to	  be	  the	  forefront	  to	  face	  imminent	  crisis.	  This	  role	  will	  not	  be	  optimal	  during	  transition	  period	  therefore	  vulnerability	  of	  the	  economy	  is	  high	  during	  that	  that	  period.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  short-­‐term	  costs	  alone	  may	  not	  necessarily	  sufficient	  to	  estimate	  the	  cost	   of	   establishment.	   The	   short-­‐term	   costs	   and	   also	   the	   long-­‐term	   costs	   of	   establishing	  OJK	  should	  also	  be	  taken	  into	  consideration.	  The	  long-­‐term	  costs	  are	  essentially	  the	  costs	  that	  may	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not	  be	  observable	  but	  will	  incur	  during	  the	  process	  of	  establishment.	  Table	  6	  summarizes	  these	  long-­‐term	  costs.	  
Table 6. Long-Term Cost Due to OJK Establishment  
Long	  Term	  Costs	  
Types	   Arguments	  Reluctance	  of	  established	  banking	  supervisors	  in	  Bank	  Indonesia	  to	  be	  incorporated	  to	  OJK	  
The	  switch	  of	  banking	  supervision	  authority	  from	  Bank	  Indonesia	  to	  OJK	  may	  induce	  experienced	  and	  highly	  qualified	  supervisors	  to	  quit.	  The	  performance	  of	  OJK	  may	  not	  be	  optimal	  as	  they	  need	  to	  invest	  their	  resources	  immensely	  to	  train	  new	  supervisors.	  Loss	  of	  tacit	  knowledge	  concerning	  supervising	  technique	  and	  system	  which	  has	  been	  long	  established	  
	  	  Supervisors’	  expertise	  cannot	  be	  foster	  with	  a	  blink	  of	  an	  eye.	  Multiple	  levels	  of	  training	  and	  field	  experiences	  are	  necessary	  inputs	  to	  establish	  an	  expertise.	  Furthermore,	  the	  characteristics	  of	  each	  business	  entity	  should	  be	  taken	  into	  consideration.	  Supervising	  knowledge	  and	  experience	  will	  accumulate	  along	  time	  and	  create	  tacit	  knowledge.	  Authority	  delegation	  to	  OJK	  does	  not	  guarantee	  that	  tacit	  knowledge	  will	  be	  successfully	  transferred	  from	  previous	  institutions.	  	  Sharp	  increase	  in	  operational	  cost	  due	  to	  the	  enormous	  number	  of	  financial	  institutions	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  supervised	  
	  Operational	  cost	  of	  supervision	  will	  increase	  drastically	  due	  to	  enormous	  scope	  and	  size	  of	  supervision.	  There	  is	  an	  additional	  86,011	  firms	  to	  be	  directly	  supervised	  hence	  it	  is	  necessary	  for	  OJK	  to	  enlarge	  its	  operational	  capacity.	  	  The	  estimation	  of	  establishment	  costs	  of	  OJK	  is	  based	  on	  several	  assumptions.	  First,	  additional	  staffs,	  especially	  financial	  supervisors,	  needed	  to	  be	  recruited	  to	  optimize	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  supervision	  of	  OJK.	  Second,	  it	  is	  inevitable	  that	  new	  investment	  should	  be	  made	  for	  establishing	  IT	   system	   for	   OJK.	   Third,	   in	   order	   to	   maintain	   OJK’s	   effectiveness	   and	   credibility	   in	   the	  supervision,	  regional	  offices	  are	  required	  to	  be	  established	  across	  Indonesia.	  In	  this	  section,	  the	  cost	  of	  building	  regional	  offices	  in	  regions	  is	  estimated.	  	  The	  cost	  of	  banking	  supervision	   is	  very	  expensive	  as	  experienced	  by	  Bank	  of	   Indonesia.	  This	  occurs	   because	   of	   complexity	   of	   the	   supervision	   process.	   Off-­‐site	   supervision	   is	   conducted	  every	  minute	  of	  the	  hour	  using	  real	  time	  data.	  Bank	  of	  Indonesia	  also	  needs	  to	  conduct	  on-­‐site	  supervision	  to	  each	  bank’s	  head	  office	  plus	  its	  branch	  office	  in	  several	  regions.	  Indeed	  Bank	  of	  Indonesia	  may	  not	  be	  able	   to	   conduct	  on-­‐site	   supervision	   to	  all	  bank’s	  branch	  offices,	  hence,	  violations	  in	  branch	  offices	  are	  possible	  with	  higher	  likelihood.	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Table 7. Estimated Coverage of Supervision by OJK 




Total Number of 
Supervised Office 
Bank Financial Institutions 
Large Bank 42 8 336 
Medium Bank 55 5 275 
Small Bank 24 3 72 
Syariah Bank 169 3 507 
BPR 1.712 1 1.712 
Sub-Total (A)     2.902 
Non-Bank Financia Institutions 
(Non-Micro) 
Insurance 144 1 144 
Stock Market 499 1 499 
Bond Market 184 1 184 
Securities Companies 158 1 158 
Pawn System Companies 1 1 1 
Pension Funds 406 1 406 
Financing Companies 212 1 212 
Capital Venture Companies 66 1 66 
Sub-Total (B) 1.670   1.670 
Micosclae Nonbanking 
Financial Institutions (MNBFI) (MNBFI) (Sub-Total) (C ) 86.504 1 86.504 
Additional Supervision Personnel: [C/(10*(A+B))]Ratio (low 
scenario) 
    8.650 
Additional Supervision Personnel: [C/(5*(A+B))] Ratio (high 
scenario)     17.301 
Sources: BI (2010a; 2010e), Bapepam-LK (2009), Biro Dana Pensiun (2009), Biro Perasuransian (2008) 
Notes:  
*)  For large banks, visitation is at the head offiice and seven branch offices. It is assumed form small and medium banks will visited. It is assumed that 
BPR has no branches, thus every BPR will be visited. For Non-Micro NBFI, it is assumed that their scale is equal to small and medium banks and 
respectively three and five offices will be visited. As BPR, every microscale NBFI will visited.  
**) In high scenario, it is assumed that every Non-Micro NBFI has equally scale as small banks small banks, thus for them will being visited by three 
offices. Untuk skenario rendah diasumsikan setiap LKNB Non-Mikro memiliki skala mirip dengan Bank Kecil, sehingga untuk masing-masing unit 
usaha akan divisitas tiga kantor. 
~) In low scenario, it is assumed that every Non-Micro NBFII has equally scale as small banks, thus for them will being visited by five offices. 	  Selection	   of	   appropriate	   sampling	   method	   is	   essential	   to	   ensure	   better	   compliance.	   The	  supervision	  method	  must	  be	  designed	  in	  such	  way	  that	  detection	  rate	  of	  violation	  is	  high.	  This	  will	   induce	   financial	   institutions	   to	   conform	   to	   the	   rule	   or	   face	   penalty	   for	   their	   violation.	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Table 8. Number of Accounts of Banking and NonBanking Industries  
TYPE INSTITUTION NUMBER OF ACCOUNTS 
Bank and BPR 
Conventioanl Bank  65.785.523  
Syariah Bank  5.643.087  
BPR and BPRS 11.571.390  
Sub Total (A) 83.000.000 
Lembaga Keuangan Nonbank 
Insurances1 43.410.774 
Pawn System Companies 20.978.984 
Pension Fund 2.559.222 
Capital Venture Companies 25.942 
Micorscale Financial Institution  41.396.401 
Government’s Program 17.033.000 












Pawn office n.a 
PNM (Unit Layanan Modal Mikro / 
UlaMM) 13.021.000 
BMT 1.175.000 
LKM LSM 286 
Sub Total (C ) 16.483.000 
Total (A+B+C) 224.887.323 
Rasio (A+B+C)/A 2,71 
Sources: calcutated from Bank Indonesia (2010e), Bapepam-LK (2009), Pawn office (2010), Perasuransian Indonesia (2008), Ashari 
(2006), The Ministry of KUKM (2009), GTZ (2005) 	  In	  order	  to	  estimate	  the	  IT	  cost	  for	  OJK,	  the	  cost	  of	  establishing	  the	  IT	  cost	  of	  Bank	  Mandiri	  has	  been	  used	   as	   a	   benchmark.	  Bank	  Mandiri	   is	   the	   biggest	   bank	   in	   Indonesia	   in	   terms	  of	   asset.	  Bank	  Mandiri	  invested	  US$200	  million	  to	  establish	  their	  IT	  system	  (Bank	  Mandiri,	  2001).	  Their	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system	   connects	   1,108	  branch	   offices	   across	   the	   country.	   Technological	   progress	   since	   2001	  without	  any	  doubt	  improve	  IT	  system	  and	  may	  decrease	  the	  cost.	  Using	  this	  assumption,	   it	   is	  estimated	   that	   the	   cost	   of	   IT	   system	   for	   OJK	   reaches	   US$200	  million	   or	   approximately	   Rp2	  trillion.18	  Table	  7	  shows	  that	  for	  the	  case	  of	  banking	  supervision,	  there	  are	  2,902	  banking	  units	  and	  1,670	  nonbanking	   units	   to	   be	   supervised	   regularly.	   The	   total	   staffs	   for	   this	   supervision	   activity	  reaches	   an	   estimate	   of	   2,297,	   this	   figure	   is	   equal	   to	   the	   number	   of	   supervisors	   in	   41	   Bank	  Indonesia	   regional	   offices,	   one	   Bank	   of	   Indonesia	   headquarter	   and	   one	   Bapepam-­‐LK	  headquarter.	  Earlier	  two	  scenarios	  of	  additional	  supervisors	  necessary	  for	  OJK	  were	  discussed.	  Assuming	  of	  low	  scenario,	  the	  ratio	  of	  86,520	  units	  to	  2,297	  staff	  equals	  to	  3.7;	  his	  implies	  that	  OJK	  needs	  155	  regional	  offices.	  High	  scenario	  implies	  the	  ratio	  of	  7.5	  which	  suggests	  that	  OJK	  needs	   310	   regional	   offices	   for	   optimum	   supervision.	   The	   estimation	   above	   is	   based	   on	  assumption	  that	  all	  banking	  and	  nonbanking	  supervisors	  in	  Bank	  Indonesia	  and	  Bapepam-­‐LK	  are	  relocated	  to	  OJK.19	  In	  order	  to	  estimate	  the	  cost	  of	  establishing	  those	  regional	  offices	  of	  OJK,	  information	  from	  the	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  BPK’s	  (The	  Supreme	  Audit	  Board)	  regional	  offices	  during	  2004-­‐2009	  will	  be	  used	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	  the	  estimation.	  BPK	  has	  only	  7	  regional	  offices	  in	  2004,	  the	  number	  increased	  to	  33	  in	  2009.	  The	  real	  value	  of	  BPK’s	  assets	  in	  2004	  was	  Rp284.27	  billion	  according	  to	  2009	  prices.	  The	  value	  increased	  to	  Rp2.76	  trillion	  in	  2009.	  The	  value	  of	  assets	  is	  based	  on	  the	  value	  of	  land,	  equipments	  and	  machines,	  building,	  and	  other	  relevant	  assets.	  The	  increase	  of	   these	   assets	   accounted	   for	   Rp1.88	   trillion	   in	   2009	   prices	   and	   it	   was	   accounted	   for	  establishment	  of	  26	  regional	  offices.	  It	   will	   be	   misleading	   to	   assume	   that	   the	   increase	   in	   asset	   is	   due	   to	   increase	   in	   number	   of	  regional	   offices.	   Increase	   in	   asset	   value	   may	   be	   due	   to	   improvement	   in	   facilities	   in	   BPK	  headquarters	   or	   previously	   established	   offices.	   Therefore,	   a	   moderate	   assumption	   that	   only	  80%	  of	   increase	  in	  asset	  value	  is	  due	  to	  establishment	  of	  new	  regional	  offices	  has	  been	  used.	  Based	  on	   the	  assumption	   the	   increase	  of	   asset	  value	  due	   to	  establishment	  of	   regional	  offices	  accounted	  for	  Rp1.51	  trillion	  or	  Rp58.11	  billion	  for	  each	  office.	  This	  estimate	  of	  cost	  consists	  of	  
                                                      
18 Assume conservative exchange rate of Rp10,000 for every US$1 
19 The number of regional offices = the number of estimated staffs/2,297; the denominator represent the benchmark number of staffs 
from 42 Bank Indonesia regional offieces. 
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land-­‐acquisition	  cost,	  building-­‐construction	  cost,	  equipment	  cost,	  and	  other	  cost	  of	  assets	  such	  as	  vehicle	  purchase	  
Table 9: Estimated Costs of Establishment and Operational of OJK  
Type of Fixed Cost  Cost per Unit 
Unit Total Cost 
Low Scenario High Scenario Low Scenario High Scenario 
Cost of OJK Draft Law 
Represntatices Rp58,11 billion 155 310 Rp9.007  billion Rp18.014 billion 
Cost of Recruitment and Tranining       
    BI Supervisor ^ Rp50 million 0 359 0 Rp17,95 billion 
    Bapepam Supervisor Rp50 million 0 0 0 0 
    Additional Supervisor 
    Rp50 million 8650 17301 Rp432,50 billion Rp865,05 billion 
IT Setup Cost Rp1.800 billion 1 1 Rp1.800 billion Rp1.800 billion 
Sub Total (A)    Rp11,240 trillion Rp 20,697 trillion 
Type of Annual Operating Cost       
Cost of Domestic Employees 
Tranining **      
    BI Supervisor Rp25 million 1,437 1,437 Rp35,93 billion Rp35,93 billion 
    Bapepam Supervisor Rp25 million 863 863 Rp21,58 billion Rp21,58 billion 
    Additional Supervisor Rp25 million 8650 17301 Rp216,25 billion Rp432,53 billion 
       
Cost of  Overseas Employees 
Training **      
    BI Supervisor Rp50million 30 30 Rp1,50 billion Rp1,50 billion 
    Bapepam Supervisor Rp50million 18 18 Rp0,900 billion Rp0,900 billion 
    Additional Supervisor ^^ Rp50million 463 926 Rp23,15 billion Rp46,30 billion 
IT Operational and Maintenances 
Cost * Rp180 billion 1 1 Rp180 billion Rp180 billion 
Cost of Salaries and Wages **      
    BI Supervisor Rp765 million 1,437 1,437 Rp1.100 trillion Rp1.100Trillion 
    Bapepam Supervisor Rp765 million 863 863 Rp660,61 billion Rp660,61 billion 
    Additional Supervisor ^^ Rp765 million 8650 17301 Rp6.621,82 billion Rp13.243,63 billion 
Operational Supervision Cost**      
    BI Supervisor Rp139 million 1,437 1,437 Rp200 billion Rp200 billion 
    Bapepam Supervisor Rp139 million 863 863 Rp120 billion Rp120 billion 
    Additional Supervisor ^^ Rp139 million 8650 17301 Rp1.203,90 billion Rp2.407,93 billion 
Facilites and Equipment 
Maintenances Cost * Rp5,81 billion 155 310 Rp900,55  billion Rp1.801 billion 
Sub Total (B)    Rp11,286 trillion Rp20, 252 trillion 
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Notes: 
*) It is assumed the maintenance cost is 10%  per annum of the total construction cost of a representative office.  
**) The average salary cost of Bapepam and Addional Supervisors in OJK scenario will be equated to BI’s expense in order to satisty incentive 
compatibility and participation constraint. 
^) In the low scenario, it assumed that all supervisors are wiliing to change their statius as OJK’s version employees. In the high scenario, it is assumed 
that 20% of BI supervisors are unwilling to join the OJK employee version.  
^^) The supervision of microscale NBFIs will be matched with microscale BPRs. Especially for mirco NBFIs, it assumed that one supervior will handle 
between 5 to 10 NBFIs. The number of microscle NBFIs is 86,504. (Cooperatives data were not included and BMT data is based on 2006 data).  
~) Based on Bank Mandiri’s expenditure when merged.	  The	  estimation	  of	  OJK’s	  establishment	  and	  operational	  costs	  above	  were	  conservative	  and	  the	  estimation	  was	  based	  on	  the	  following	  assumptions:	  	  
1. The	   supervision	   burden	   of	   banking	   and	   nonbanking	   institutions	   is	   equivalent.	   This	  assumption	  is	  very	  strong	  since	  we	  have	  no	  necessary	  data	  from	  previous	  research	  that	  estimate	   the	   real	   burden	   of	   banking	   and	   nonbanking	   supervision.	   The	   variability	   of	  transaction	   types	   within	   nonbanking	   supervision	   should	   also	   account	   for	   different	  measure	  of	  supervision	  burden.	  	  
2. Recruitment	  and	  training	  cost	  of	  additional	  staffs	  in	  high	  scenario	  assumes	  that	  20%	  of	  supervisors	  from	  Bank	  Indonesia	  do	  not	  join	  OJK.	  This	  moderate	  assumption	  is	  looking	  at	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  decision	  to	  join	  OJK	  is	  very	  subjective.	  Supervisors	  in	  Bank	  Indonesia	  who	  view	  that	  this	  unification	  is	  full	  of	  uncertainty	  and	  has	  status	  quo	  bias	  will	  have	  less	  willingness	  to	  join	  OJK.	  
3. Depreciation	   cost	   of	   building	   and	   IT	   system	   is	   assumed	   to	   be	   10%	   each	   year.	   This	  assumption	   is	   derived	   from	   Ministry	   Decree	   Kimpraswil	   No.	   332/KPTS/M/2002.	   It	  states	  that	  maximum	  maintenance	  cost	  of	  minor	  damage	  is	  30%	  of	  cost	  of	  building	  that	  particular	  infrastructure;	  however,	  it	  is	  assumed	  that	  the	  depreciation	  rate	  is	  only	  10%	  per	  year.	  	  
4. The	  establishment	  cost	  of	  IT	  system	  refers	  to	  Bank	  Mandiri	  that	  is	  US$200	  million.	  Using	  conservative	   exchange	   rate	   of	   Rp9,000	   per	   US$1,	   the	   cost	   of	   establishment	   is	   Rp1.8	  trillion.	  The	  cost	  that	  Bank	  Mandiri	  bear	  was	  actually	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  IT	  system,	  not	  on	  purchase	  of	  hardware.	  Again,	  our	  assumption	  is	  moderate	  looking	  at	  the	  fact	  that	  Rp1.8	  trillion	  will	  be	  spent	  on	  both	  establishing	  IT	  system	  and	  purchasing	  hardware	  for	  155-­‐310	  regional	  offices.	  	  
5. The	  wage	  and	  compensation	  for	  staffs	  in	  OJK	  will	  be	  assumed	  to	  be	  similar	  to	  those	  of	  supervisors	   in	   Bank	   of	   Indonesia.	   This	   assumption	   arises	   to	   present	   incentive	  
	   28 
compatibility	  and	  participation	  constraint	  due	  to	  unification	  from	  various	  institutions	  to	  OJK.	  There	  will	  be	  little	  incentive	  for	  supervisors	  from	  Bank	  Indonesia	  to	  join	  OJK	  if	  this	  assumption	  does	  not	  hold.	  Table	  9	  summarizes	  the	  estimation	  of	  OJK’s	  establishment	  cost.	  The	  transition	  cost	  of	  switching	  supervision	   authority	   from	   the	   existing	   regulators	   to	   OJK	   accounted	   for	   Rp11.24	   trillion	   to	  Rp20.69	   trillion.	   The	   annual	   operational	   cost	   reaches	   similar	   figures	   of	   Rp11.28	   trillion	   to	  Rp20.25	   trillion.	   These	   estimates	   will	   effortlessly	   change	   if	   there	   are	   departures	   from	   the	  assumptions.	   For	   example,	   the	   figure	  would	   change	   if	   the	  Draft	  Act	   includes	   cooperatives	   as	  well.	  The	  estimated	  costs	  would	  increase	  if	  the	  supervision	  burden	  of	  banking	  and	  nonbanking	  institutions	  is	  different.	  Further	  inquiry	  regarding	  OJK	  is	  who	  would	  fund	  these	  enormous	  costs	  of	  establishment?	  The	  first	  sensible	  alternative	  is	  APBN	  (national	  budget).	  The	  national	  budget	   in	  2011	  will	  bear	  an	  extra	   of	   Rp22.52	   trillion	   to	   Rp40.94	   trillion—depending	   on	   the	   scenario—or	   1.9%	   to	   3.4%	  from	  the	   total	  budget	  of	  Rp1,204	  trillion.	  This	  proportion	   is	  relatively	  huge	   in	  comparison	  of	  the	   GOI’s	   spending	   in	   other	   fields:	   (1)	   the	   proportion	   of	   wage	   and	   compensation	   of	   civil	  servants	  was	  7.4%	  in	  2010;	  (2)	  the	  proportion	  of	  Ministry	  of	  Health’s	  budget	  was	  only	  	  2%	  in	  2010;	  (3)	  the	  proportion	  of	  agricultural	  sector	  subsidy	  was	  1.3%	  in	  2010;	  (4)	  the	  proportion	  of	  food	  subsidy	  was	  1.2%	  in	  2010;	  (5)	  the	  proportion	  of	  health	  subsidy	  was	  only	  0.034%	  in	  2010	  (The	  Ministry	  of	  Finance,	  	  2010).	  The	   second	   feasible	   alternative	   is	   funding	   from	   loan.	   This	   alternative	   must	   be	   carefully	  examined	  since	  there	  would	  be	  additional	  Rp48	  trillion	  of	  debt	  added.	  The	  range	  of	  debt	  that	  Indonesia	   had	   taken	   during	   2006-­‐2009	  was	   Rp13.3	   trillion	   to	   Rp46.9	   trillion.	   Assuming	   the	  debt	  in	  2011	  is	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  in	  2010	  plus	  the	  cost	  of	  OJK’s	  establishment,	  the	  national	  debt	  would	  increase	  about	  30%	  to	  55%,	  totaling	  Rp75	  trillion.	  This	  amount	  is	  much	  larger	  than	  the	  highest	   debt	   that	   Indonesia	   has	   ever	   taken.	   This	   option	   will	   eventually	   put	   burden	   on	   the	  national	  budget	  in	  latter	  period.	  There	   is	   also	   time	   cost	   in	   the	   establishment	   of	  OJK.	  Martinez	   and	  Rose	   (2003),	  who	   studied	  cases	  from	  14	  countries,	  suggest	  that	  time	  cost	  include	  establishment	  of	  organization	  structure,	  law	  structure,	  strategic	  plan,	  integration	  of	  IT	  system,	  division	  of	  tasks,	  and	  and	  appointment	  of	  
	   29 
person	   in	   charge	   in	   each	   division.	   It	  may	   take	   up	   to	   two	   years	   to	   establish	   such	   institution.	  Their	   suggestion,	   however,	   are	   based	   on	   cases	   in	   developed	   countries	   where	   flow	   of	  information	  are	  relatively	  better	  than	  that	  in	  Indonesia.	  Without	  hesitation,	  we	  may	  expect	  that	  establishment	  of	  OJK	  requires	  more	  than	  2	  years.	  
5. Financial	  Supervision	  System	  Alternative	  Incentives	   for	   corruption,	   money	   laundering,	   and	   manipulation	   are	   essentially	   trigerred	   by	  asymmetric	   information.	   	   Asymetric	   information	   problems	   in	   financial	   sector	   is	   paramount,	  unless	  financial	  institutions	  (financial	  supervisory	  bodies)	  implement	  extra	  cautious	  approach	  to	  know	  their	  customers	  (supervisees).	  Two	  key	  motives	  for	  the	  use	  of	  extra	  cautious	  approach	  in	  financial	  supervision	  are	  due	  to	  the	  problems	  of	  asymmetric	  information	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  financial	  sector	  to	  contribute	  to	  systemic	  risk	  to	  the	  economy.	  	  	  Households,	  for	  example,	  may	  borrow	  from	  bank	  and	  nonbanking	  institution	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  Ideally,	   the	   maximum	   monthly	   installment	   is	   1/3	   of	   household	   income;	   however,	   the	   true	  income	  is	  now	  biased	  upward	  since	  households	  borrow	  from	  two	  different	  sources.	  This	  may	  not	   be	   evident	   in	   the	   financial	   system	   accounting	   since	   there	   is	   no	   server	   that	   consolidates	  information	   from	   banking	   and	   nonbanking	   institutions.	   In	   other	   word,	   Bank	   Indonesia,	  Bapepam-­‐LK,	  and	  the	  Ministry	  of	  KUKM	  do	  not	  share	  information	  that	  allows	  data	  sharing	  and	  data	   interfacing	   among	   the	   regulators.	   This	   phenomenon	   leads	   to	   low	   detection	   rate	   in	  monitoring	  potential	  offences	  by	  households.	  	  Criminal	   offences	   in	   financial	   sectors	   are	   also	   evident	   from	   the	   point	   of	   view	   of	   the	   capital	  owners.	   The	   major	   fraudulent	   case	   in	   financial	   sector	   known	   as	   Antaboga	   Case	   is	   a	  manifestation	  of	  absence	  of	  database	  sharing	  among	   the	  existing	  regulators.	  Evident	  cases	  of	  offences	  in	  financial	  sectors	  either	  from	  the	  households	  or	  the	  capital	  owners’	  side	  are	  just	  the	  tip	  of	  the	  iceberg.	  There	  is	  no	  real	  figure	  of	  these	  practices.	  The	  only	  apparent	  consequence	  is	  the	  increase	  of	  vulnerability	  of	  the	  economy	  to	  crisis.	  Having	  realized	  that	  the	  major	  problem	  faced	  by	  the	  existing	  authorities	  is	  criminal	  offences	  in	  financial	   sector,	   ideally,	   any	   attempt	   to	   establish	   financial	   regulatory	   authority	   aims	   to	  minimized	   the	   occurrence	   of	   those	   practices	   and	   systemic	   risk.	   Those	   attempts	  may	   include	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improvement	  in	  the	  flow	  and	  quality	  of	  information,	  transparency	  of	  the	  financial	  institutions,	  and	  improvement	  in	  the	  coordination	  among	  regulatory	  authorities.	  	  Ironically,	  OJK	  Draft	  Act	  did	  not	  reveal	  any	  strategy	  to	  minimize	  those	  offences.	  The	  majority	  of	  articles	   in	   the	   Draft	   Act	   merely	   address	   the	   process	   of	   establishing	   OJK.	   Issues	   regarding	  improvement	  of	  coordination,	  strategies	  and	  mechanism	  of	  data	  sharing	  and	  data	  interfacing,	  as	  well	  as	  strategies	  to	  increase	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  supervision	  were	  not	  discussed	  in	  the	  Draft	  Act.	  The	  existence	  of	   the	  Draft	  Act	   is	  another	  manifestation	  of	  beliefs	   that	  any	  emerging	  problem	  must	  be	  handled	  by	  establishing	  a	  new	  institution.	  Policymakers	  simply	  disregard	  the	  fact	  that	  establishing	  a	  new	  institution	  may	  induce	  new	  problems.	   In	  addition,	  establishment	  of	  a	  new	  institution	   is	   a	   costly	   decision	   in	   monetary	   term.	   As	   previously	   discussed,	   the	   cost	   of	  establishment	   includes,	   but	   not	   limited	   to,	   cost	   of	   establishing	   district	   offices,	   IT	   system,	  organizational	  blueprint,	  recruiting	  human	  resources,	  and	  other	  costs.	  	  Learning	  from	  recent	  experiences,	   the	  establishment	  of	  new	  institutions	   in	  Indonesia	  such	  as	  Corruption	  Eradication	  Committee	  (KPK),	  Indonesia	  Financial	  Transaction	  Report	  and	  Analysis	  Centre	   (PPATK),	   Indonesia	   Deposit	   Insurance	   Cooperation	   (LPS),	   and	   Indonesian	   National	  Board	   for	   Disaster	   Management	   (BNPB)	   requires	   at	   least	   two	   years	   before	   each	   operates	  optimally	  as	  an	  institution.	  During	  the	  transition	  period,	  each	  institution	  will	  focus	  on	  how	  to	  unravel	  organizational	  quandaries	  within	  the	  institution.	  BNPB	  is	  an	  example	  of	  such	  dilemma.	  The	  institution	  was	  acknowledged	  in	  October	  2007	  and	  was	  planned	  to	  establish	  399	  district	  offices.	  Until	  recently,	  there	  are	  only	  108	  district	  offices	  established.	  Efforts	  to	  minimize	  asymmetric	  information	  will	  be	  optimal	  if	  policymakers	  focus	  on	  attempts	  to	  increase	  transparency	  within	  the	  existing	  regulators.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  draft	  act	  only	  focuses	  on	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  new	  institution.	  Doubts	  have	  surfaced	  whether	  the	  establishment	  of	  OJK	  will	  be	  effective	  in	  optimizing	  the	  supervision	  of	  financial	  sector.	  The	  establishment	  of	  OJK,	  nonetheless,	  will	   not	   eliminate	   structural	   problem	   in	   the	   existing	   supervision	   scheme.	  There	  still	  are	  thousands	  of	  nonbanking	  institutions	  that	  will	  not	  be	  supervised	  optimally	  even	  if	  OJK	  would	  be	  established.	  If	  one	  of	  these	  institutionspractices	  moral	  hazard,	  the	  defenseless	  society	  will	  be	  the	  one	  who	  burden	  the	  damage	  caused.	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We	   present	   two	   alternative	   supervision	   methods,	   labeled	   as	   SPLK	   (system	   pengawasan	  lembaga	   keuangan)	   or	   Financial	   Institutions	   Supervision	   System.	   We	   designed	   the	   system	  mainly	   by	   considering	   the	   structure	   of	   Indonesian	   financial	   market.	   The	   system	   is	   also	  designed	  to	  accommodate	  the	  economic	  and	  cultural	  state	  of	  the	  country.	  Our	  further	  principle	  is	  that	  we	  don’t	  need	  costly	  establishment	  cost	  if	  we	  can	  optimize	  a	  framework	  with	  relatively	  low	   cost.	   Furthermore,	   we	   hold	   the	   principle	   that	   we	   should	   optimize	   the	   role	   existing	  authorities	  instead	  of	  setting	  up	  a	  new	  one.	  
5.1. 	  First	  Alternative:	  The	  Three-­‐Pillar	  Model	  Our	  first	  alternative	  of	  SPLK	  is	  the	  Three-­‐Pillar	  System	  (Figure	  1).	  The	  system	  utilizes	  existing	  regulators:	   Bank	   Indonesia,	   Bapepam-­‐LK,	   and	   the	   Ministry	   of	   KUKM.	   The	   system	   require	  
renaissance	   of	   these	  authorities,	  particularly	  by:	   (1)	   increasing	   the	   supervision	  quality	  of	   the	  three	   authorities	   and	   level	   out	   their	   responsibility	   in	   the	   supervision	   of	   financial	   sector;	   (2)	  implementing	  obligation	  of	  data	  sharing	  and	  data	  interfacing	  among	  the	  three	  authorities.	  	  The	  focus	  of	  supervision	  of	  the	  three	  authorities	  will	  differ	  since	  each	  will	  implement	  particular	  method	   that	   conforms	   to	   the	   characteristic	   of	   the	   supervisees.	   Supervision	   of	   banking	  institutions	   by	   Bank	   of	   Indonesia	  will	   focus	   on	   prudential	   aspects	   such	   as	  macroprudential,	  microprudential,	   and	   conduct	   of	   business.	   Supervision	   of	   stock	  market	   by	   Bapepam-­‐LK	  will	  focus	  on	  conformity	  principle	  and	  supervision	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  KUKM	  focuses	  on	  cooperatives	  principles.	   The	   variability	   in	   the	   supervision	   system	   is	   logical;	   however	   standardization	   of	  supervision	  quality	  is	  indispensable.	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Figure 5: The Three Pilar Model 
It is	  envisaged	  that	  the	  three	  authorities	  will	  practice	  data	  sharing	  and	  data	  interfacing.	  Figure	  1	   shows	   the	   consolidation	   of	   information	   among	   the	   authorities.	   The	   arrows	   imply	   active	  exchange	  of	  information	  among	  the	  authorities	  which	  will	  increase	  the	  detection	  rate	  of	  moral	  hazard	  practices.	  We	  apply	  Becker’s	  (1968)	  approach	  that	  increase	  the	  detection	  rate	  of	  crime	  activities	  as	  an	  effort	  to	  increase	  the	  deterrence	  effect	  of	  potential	  offenders.	  Data	  sharing	  and	  data	  interfacing	  is	  not	  a	  rocket	  science	  in	  today’s	  modern	  era	  and	  they	  will	  excel	  detection	  rate	  precipitously	  with	  relatively	  lower	  cost.	  The	  Three	  Pillar	  System	  proposed	  a	  change	  in	  the	  existing	  supervision	  structure.	  Bapepam-­‐LK	  will	   focus	   on	   regulating	   and	   supervising	   stock	  market	   and	   commodity	  market.20	   The	   system	  shall	  not	  put	  burden	  on	  Bapepam-­‐LK	  on	  supervising	  nonbanking	  institutions	  which	  are	  spread	  around	   the	   country.	   We	   suggested	   that	   the	   role	   of	   regulating	   and	   supervising	   nonbanking	  institutions	  should	  be	  assigned	  to	  the	  Ministry	  of	  KUKM.	  We	  believe	  this	  proposal	   is	  sensible	  since	  the	  Ministry	  of	  KUKM	  possesses	  district	  offices	  throughout	  the	  country.	   	  The	  Ministry	  of	  KUKM	  will	  supervise	  cooperative,	  credit	  union,	  and	  BMT,	  as	  well	  as	  microfinancial	  institutions.	  
                                                      
20 Commodity market is currently supervised and regulated by the Ministry of Industry.  
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We	   argue	   that	   the	  Ministry	   of	   KUKM	   is	   capable	   of	   such	   responsibility	   since	   they	   have	   been	  supervising	  71,000	  cooperatives	  in	  recent	  years.	  Last	  of	  all,	  Bank	  of	  Indonesia	  will	  still	  hold	  the	  responsibility	  to	  regulate	  and	  supervise	  banking	  and	  BPR.	  	  This	   system	   should	   directly	   be	   responsible	   to	   the	   president	   since	   the	  wellbeing	   of	   financial	  sector	  is	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  executives.	  
5.2. Two-­‐	  Stage	  System	  	  We	  proposed	  the	  second	  alternative	  which	  is	  entitled	  as	  the	  Two-­‐Stage	  System.	  The	  system	  is	  the	  modification	  of	  the	  Three-­‐Pillar	  System	  by	  incorporating	  PPATK	  into	  the	  system	  (Figure	  2).	  PPATK	  will	  ensure	  that	  data	  sharing	  and	  data	  interfacing	  are	  implemented	  by	  the	  authorities.	  We	  have	  argued	  previously	  that	  individuals	  might	  have	  low	  tendency	  in	  coordination,	  yet	  again	  their	  different	  badges.	  This	  will	   likely	   induce	  egocentrism	  among	  governing	  authorities.	  This	  phenomenon	  is	  practical	  not	  only	  Indonesia	  but	  also	  in	  the	  more	  developed	  economies.	  	  
 Figure	  6:	  Two	  Stage	  System	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This	  scheme	  suggests	  that	  each	  authority	  holds	  all	  responsibilities	  of	  supervising	  its	  particular	  sector.	   For	   example,	   Bank	   Indonesia	   (the	   Ministry	   of	   KUKM)	   will	   be	   responsible	   for	   all	  transactions	   that	  occurred	  among	  banks	   (cooperatives).	  We	  noted	   that	   financial	   transactions	  have	   occurred	   intermarket.	   The	   responsibility	   of	   supervising	   this	   range	   of	   transactions	   is	  assigned	   to	   PPATK.	   The	   outcome	   of	   this	   assignment	   is	   that	   PPATK	  must	   have	   investigation	  authority.	  This	  mechanism	  is	  very	  practical	  since	  PPATK	  is	  the	  coordinator	  of	  data	  sharing	  and	  data	   interfacing.	   If	   PPATK	  possesses	  data	   consolidation	   therefore	   its	  detection	   capabilities	   is	  supreme.21	  Technically,	  this	  system	  is	  more	  superior	  to	  the	  Three-­‐Pillar	  System	  since	  PPATK	  will	  actively	  bridge	  the	  gap	  in	  terms	  of	  data	  sharing	  and	  data	   interfacing.	  We	  noted	  the	  complexity	  of	  this	  system	   that	   is	   the	   need	   to	   augment	   PPATK’s	   role	   to	   investigating	   authority	   requires	  amendment	   of	   Anti	   Money	   Laundering	   Act	   (UU	   Tindak	   Pidana	   Pencucian	   Uang	   or	   TPPU).22	  Nevertheless,	   the	   complexity	   of	   amending	   this	   particular	   Bill	   is	   relatively	   straightforward	   in	  comparison	  to	  amending	  several	  Acts	  owing	  to	  the	  establishment	  OJK.	  	  
6.	  Conclusion	  The	   establishment	   of	   a	   financial	   service	   regulatory	   authority	   aims	   to	   enhance	   the	   existing	  financial	   supervision	   system.	   This,	   however,	   may	   not	   be	   the	   case	   for	   the	   GOI’s	   proposal	   to	  establish	   OJK	   through	   OJK	   Draft	   Act.	   The	   existing	   system	   of	   financial	   supervision	   is	  characterized	  by	  a	  huge	  gap	  in	  supervision,	  whereby	  thousand	  of	  nonbanking	  institutions	  have	  not	  been	  supervised	  properly.	  The	  proposal	  of	  establishing	  OJK,	  however,	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  close	  the	  gap.	  	  Currently	   the	   existing	   financial	   regulators	   have	   different	   approach	   in	   supervising	   financial	  institutions	  depending	  on	  the	  supervisees’	  characteristics.	  Thus	  far,	  the	  quality	  of	  supervision	  by	  the	  regulators	  is	  far	  from	  homogeneous,	  therefore	  the	  improvement	  and	  the	  standarsization	  of	   supervision	   quality	   is	   indispensable.	   Ideally,	   any	   attempt	   to	   establish	   a	   financial	   service	  
                                                      
21 PPATK does not have the investigation authority currently. This is a setback in the effort of corruption eradication. 
Furthermore, UNCIC stated that money laundering is an act of corruption. However, Anti-Corruption Bill in Indonesia 
does not consider money laundering as such.  
22 The money laundering act (UU TPPU) which was ratified in October 2010 was first proposed in 2006. 
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regulatory	   authority	   should	   be	   able	   to	   improve	   and	   to	   standardize	   the	   quality	   of	   financial	  supervision;	  however	  this	  may	  not	  be	  the	  case	  for	  OJK.	  	  	  Any	   attempt	   to	   establish	   an	   institution	   as	   a	   reaction	   to	   solve	   any	   emerging	   problem	   is	  obviously	   costly.	   It	   was	   shown	   that	   the	   estimated	   costs	   of	   establishing	   OJK	   is	   paramount,	  however,	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   OJK	   is	   questionable.	   This	   gives	   rises	   to	   two	   alternative	  approaches	   of	   establishing	   a	   financial	   service	   regulatory	   authority	   namely	   the	   Three-­‐Pillar	  system	  and	  the	  Two-­‐Stage	  system.	  Both	  approaches	  provide	  a	  good	  opportunity	  for	  the	  GOI	  to	  overhaul	  the	  system	  of	  financial	  supervision	  and	  to	  reshape	  the	  system	  in	  a	  better	  way.	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